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Abstract
Information sharing has become eminent to supply
chain management, as it allows supply chain
partners to collaborate more closely. However,
currently supply chain partners are often on disjoint
information platforms, which prevent them from
effectively sharing critical supply chain
information. One of the main barriers of
information sharing is revealing confidential
information to unintended parties and thus the
disclosure of privacy. Therefore the information
sharing needs and characteristics of a supply chain
has been analyzed and subsequently a cross
platform privacy and security framework to allow
safe information sharing has been proposed.

Introduction
Supply chain management (SCM) has become a
much discussed topic and as believed by many,
business does not compete on a product level any
more, but business competes and differentiates on a
supply chain level [1]. It is inevitable that
information sharing is needed for businesses to
cooperate and many argue that information sharing
is a key ingredient for a successful SCM [2]. The
advent of RFID technology takes the information
sharing detail level to an even higher level, as it can
provide information about the physical product
movement on an item level. Basically, RFID allows
supply chain partners to integrate the physical flow
with the information flow.
There are currently many service platforms to
facilitate information sharing between supply chain
partners. However, sharing information between
these service platforms is not a common practice.
There is therefore an urgent need to share
information across these disjoined service
platforms, as the number of service platforms
expand. Privacy and security in its broadest sense is
a barrier for companies to share information [3] [4].
In general, the privacy and security are in place for
individual service platforms, but there lacks a
privacy and security framework for sharing
information across platforms. Thus in order to
facilitate cross platform information sharing, a
privacy and security framework needs to be

developed first to lower the barrier of information
sharing between supply chain partners.
The objective of this study is to develop a
privacy and security framework for cross platform
information sharing for supply chain partners. In
order to satisfy the supply chain needs, we analyze
the information sharing requirements based on the
following areas:
• Supply chain information sharing issues
and concerns on security and current
measures typically in use, and,
• Typical scenarios of supply chain
management practices in the context of
privacy and security.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next
section we provide an overview of information
sharing across supply chains, subsequently we
present the findings of our case study. Based on the
case study, we propose a cross platform privacy and
security framework to safeguard confidential
information sharing. Moreover, the proposed
platform is illustrated by a typical information
sharing scenario. Finally, we conclude and give
some remarks on our future work.

Literature review
There are currently many platforms available to
share supply chain information. Many of the
existing platforms focus on parts of information
sharing, e.g. EPCglobal, focuses on RFID data and
Dell’s VMI system focuses on suppliers. However,
in order to gain visibility, supply chains partners
may need information that reach beyond RFID data
and beyond only the suppliers segment. [5][6] for
instance described that inventory information
sharing across the entire supply chain can lessen
the order placing distortion, also known as the
Forrester effect and the Bullwhip effect
respectively. Therefore supply chains are in need
for a platform and cross platform to share
information among its supply chain partners.
Information sharing across enterprise
boundaries in supply chains involves many issues.
In a generic supply chain, there are raw
material/parts/semi-finished
goods,
suppliers,
logistics
services
provider,
manufacturers,
wholesalers, retailers [7]. Wholesalers or retailers
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process purchase orders to suppliers, and logistics
services providers will deliver the requested
materials to manufacturers and they will deliver the
finished goods to wholesalers and then retailers.
Back and forth information flow across these
parties could sometimes happen on more than one
supply chains. For example, a dye manufacturer
order raw materials from a vendor, the information
flow here impact both a garment brand store’s
supply chain as well as a painting oil brand store’s
supply chain. Such multi-parties and multi-supply
chain scenario makes the information sharing more
complicated, and the privacy issues arises here [8].
Other privacy concerns include specific
products’ volume, relationship, and contracts, price,
manufacturer’s customer contacts; the nature of
relationship can be viewed as vendor-manufacturer
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sharing framework for supply chains. However, the
current literature lacks examples of how
information is shared among supply chain partners
and platform. Therefore a case study is used as an
illustration of a typical supply chain. This research
methodology is well suited for this problem, as it
can bring out the problems that arise during
information sharing. Moreover, case studies can
provide information about a given context and
eventually deduce theories from it [15].
Case study
For this study we studied a supply chain for power
tools, e.g. power drills. The supply chain consists
of a supplier, a manufacturer, a trader, and a
retailer. The supplier and the manufacturer are both
located in China, where the supplier provides the

Figure 1. Case - supply chain setting
[6], upstream-downstream partners, distribution
center-retailer (warehouse charges), and retailerconsumer (CRM) [9][10]. Most privacy-protecting
schemes for RFID have focused on the consumer
privacy problems. Industrial privacy, i.e. data
secrecy and business confidentiality, is important
too, but less frequently considered [11].
As aforementioned, supply chains can exist of
many different supply chain partners. Usually
supply chain partnership is characterized as a
buyer-supplier relationship [12]. The supply chain
partnership can vary from being fixed e.g. by
contracts [13] to being dynamic e.g. ad hoc
collaboration [14]. Fixed supply chain partnership
has the characteristic of being lasting in which the
relationship is clearly defined. Dynamic supply
chain partnership on the other hand is ad hoc and
can change from transaction to transaction.
Therefore, dynamic partnership brings a new
element to privacy and security in a supply chain
context where it has to adapt to both the established
and changing supply chain partnerships.

Methodology

parts and accessories and where the manufacturer
assembles the power tools. A trader, located in
Hong Kong, functions as a middle man between the
manufacturer and retailer to source, to WPK
(warehousing packing kitting), and to ship the
products to the retailer. Obviously, the trader does
not actually perform the all the activities, e.g. WPK
and the shipping. The trader outsources these
activities to a 3PL and a carrier respectively.
Finally, the retailer, located in the USA, owns
several stores and DCs in order to sell the power
tools to the consumers.
The power tools supply chain partners are
distributed among three platforms, with the
manufacturer, trader, DC, and retailer as the main
information sharing partners (see Figure 2).
The manufacturer is on a platform called the
“manufacturer platform” and on this platform the
supplier can share information with the
manufacturer, e.g. part delivery tracking
information. Therefore the manufacturer can be
considered as the data owner and where the
supplier only provides information to the
manufacturer.

The main objective of this study is to create a
privacy and security cross platform information

The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009

584

Jerrel Leung, Frank C.H. Tong, Zongwei Luo

Furthermore, the trader is on a platform called
the “trader platform” and where the 3PL and
carrier can share information with the trader,
e.g. shipping tracking. Trucker A and
warehouse X in their turn can share information
with the 3PL, e.g. warehouse receipt
confirmation, who subsequently can pass

Figure 2. Case - Supply chain information
sharing infrastructure
through the data to the trader. Therefore the trader
can be considered as the data owner and where the
3PL, carrier, trucker A, and warehouse X only
provides information to the trader.
Finally, the DC and the retailer are on the
“retailer platform”. Store, trucker B and warehouse
Y can provide information to the DC and retailer,
e.g. inventory status. Therefore the Retailer and DC
can be considered as the data owner and where the
store, trucker B, and warehouse Y only provides
information to the retailer.
Currently, the information sharing between
platforms are performed manually, e.g. by email,
phone, and fax. The data that needs to be shared is
in general already detailed by means of contracts.
The depicted supply chain (Figure 2) shows that
the supply chain partners already share information
within their supply chain segment (platform), but

cross platform information sharing is less well
established. The information sharing between data
owners, and in this case the major supply chain
partners, are generally predetermined by contracts,
and in some cases by ad hoc project, and can
usually be obtained manually. However, there are
cases, where for instance warehouse X needs
information of the DC. In such case, this

information sharing might not be covered by
contracts, as they might not even be aware that they
are within the same supply chain, and the trial to
obtain the particular information can become a
dreadful process. First warehouse X needs to
contact the 3PL, who needs to contact the trader
and who in its turn, contacts the DC for the
particular
information.
Subsequently,
the

information has to travel the same path backwards
to deliver the information to warehouse X.

Cross platform privacy and security
framework
We propose the following cross platform privacy
and security framework (CPPF), in order to allow
supply chain partners seamlessly share information
across platforms. The proposed CPPF must have
the following in place:
Cross platform environment – There exists
a technology that allows us to single uniquely
identify (SUI) each item, e.g. similar to EPC code
for RFID information and MAC address for
computer network cards. Moreover, there exist
some form of 3rd party e-service [16] that can
discover per SUI request of all platforms that
contain information about the SUI. For now we call
this service the SUI discovery service (SUI-DS).
Some Internet-aware addressing form will be
provided as a pointer to the platform containing the
SUI data. Let us take the Object Name Service
(ONS) of EPCglobal as an example of how this is
performed for RFID data [17].
Information portal – Each portal knows
three roles 1) Sole Operator (SO), which is the
platform itself, e.g. manufacturer platform as
described by the aforementioned case study 2) Data
Owner (DO), the supply chain partner who owns
the data, e.g. manufacturer as described in the
aforementioned case study, and 3) 3rd Party
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Contributor (3PC), the supply chain partners who
act as data providers, e.g. the supplier in the
manufacturer platform as described in the
aforementioned case study
Data dimension – For the CPPF we
categorize the data by their data dimensions, which
include location, sensitivity, and ownership. Data
can be stored in different locations, e.g. local
database, intranet, and Internet, and we assume that
information stored on the platform are considered
as information that can be shared with selected
supply chain partners. Data sensitivity implies that
data can be classified according to different
sensitivity levels, e.g. high, medium, and low.
Where high sensitivity contains item specific data
that can reveal “trade secrets” and these data
should only be shared with close supply chain
partners. While low sensitive data contains generic
data and can be shared with less close supply chain
partners. Finally, data ownership in this framework
includes the roles as described above, namely data
owner and third party. The reader is referred to
[18][19][20] for further readings about the data
dimensions.
Privacy preference – This is the preference
of the requested information provider in terms of
privacy protection when sharing information [21],
meaning what information to share with what type
of relationship, e.g. sharing of high sensitive data
with “close” supply chain partners and sharing of
low sensitive data with indirect supply chain
partners. The privacy preference concept is initially
developed to collect personal information of any
user [22] and in this project we extent the concept

Security Scheme – One party is the receiver
(of information) and the other party is the sender.
The ‘send’ and ‘receive’ can actually be
implemented by ‘grant’ and ‘access’ (the sender
granting the access to the receiver, and the receiver
accessing the information intended to be shared by
the sender). The general practices, such as simple
rights as read-only, write-only or read-and-write,
are to be adopted along with other more fine
grained access control at such the best visibility can
be obtained with the maximum protection of
privacy.
The general information sharing follows these
similar steps:
1. Data request of a DO – A request from a
DO, the receiver for information is posted
to an information portal.
2. SUI-DS determines data location – The
information portal queries the SUI-DS,
and the data location pointers are returned.
3. SOs matches privacy preference – The
information requesting DO submits its
privacy preference, and the information
sender DO does the same. Based on an
authorization scheme, the characteristics
of information sharing are determined.
4. Exchange of information – The receiver
obtains the information as intended by
both parties with privacy and security
ensured.

Figure 3. Cross platform privacy and security
framework

explain and illustrate CPPF. In this scenario we
portray that the supply chain partners are in a cross
platform environment as described by CPPF,
trucker B of the retailer platform wants to obtain
information of the carrier of the trader platform, e.g.
delivery note (DN), as shown in Figure 3 with the
thicker lines depicting the information sharing path.
Previously, trucker B had to call or fax the trading
company to obtain the DN, who in its turn had to
obtain it from the carrier operator. However, with
CPPF trucker B can access the DN via existing

to a B2B context. Thus each supply chain partner
can specify sharing information preference, for
different types of supply chain partners. The data
sharing is determined based on the privacy
preference at the time of data request and therefore
can support both fixed and dynamic relationships
[21].

Information sharing across platforms
scenario
We will discuss one typical scenario to better
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Transparent
Manufacturer XYZ
123 street name
China
01 January 2010
ETA
Product A – 50 pieces in 5 cartons
Quantity
Product B – 80 pieces in 4 cartons
Product A – 100kg
Gross
Product B – 80kg
weight
Product A - $25/piece
Price
Product B - $10/piece
Table 1: Data sensitivity
Vendor

retailer platform. In order to obtain the DN trucker
B must go through the following steps:
1.

Data request of a DO – Trucker B is a
3PC and in CPPF the SOs only are aware
the DOs, as described by the information
portal of CPPF. Therefore trucker B sends
out a data request to the DC, as the DC is
the data owner. The DC in its turn sends
out a data request of the specific DN to the
retailer platform.
2. SUI-DS determines data location – Thus
the DC queries the retailer platform for the
specific DN on behalf of trucker B. The
retailer platform subsequently queries the
SUI-DS, and the SUI-DS web service
returns a pointer with the platform (trader
platform) containing the specific DN.
3. SOs matches privacy preference – The DO
requester (DC) submits its privacy
preference and the DO provider (trader)
submits its privacy preference. In our
scenario the privacy preference is a fixed
relationship, by means of a contract, and
the relationship predetermined a security
scheme that only a translucent view, see
below for an explanation of the translucent
view, of DN should be shared to the DC.
4. Exchange of information – Since the
privacy preference allows a translucent
view of the DN to be shared with the DC,
the DC receives the translucent view DN
information from the trader platform via
its own retailer platform and passes the
DN to trucker B.
In our scenario we consider that the DN data
is stored on the platform and therefore can be
shared with supply chain partners. Moreover, we
propose three views of the DN (based on the data
sensitivity) in our security scheme, namely
transparent, translucent, and opaque [23]. In the
current practice we usually either completely share
the data (transparent) or not share the data at all
(opaque). However, this might not be adequate to
facilitate the needs of the supply chain and we

Translucent
Manufacturer
China

in

Opaque
-

01 January 2010
9 cartons

-

100 – 200 kg

-

$10 - $ 30 per piece

-

therefore propose a third view, namely translucent.
In the translucent view supply chain partners can
share only selected/aggregated data. An illustrative
simple version of the DN is shown in Table 1.
The translucent view provides trucker B with
adequate information to anticipate and to prepare
the transportation of the products, without
disclosing sensitive information of the trading
company (e.g. manufacturer name and price). With
this view we can create a mutual benefit, where
trucker B can plan their operations in advance and
where the trading company does not have to worry
about disclosing sensitive information.

Concluding remarks
In order to facilitate information sharing across
entire supply chains, a solution is needed to
connect the disjoined platforms. This study
addressed the privacy and security issues of this
solution. We have proposed a novel information
sharing platform to safeguard confidential
information shared across platforms. Literature has
been reviewed and a case study has been utilized to
portray a typical supply chain set up. The
framework is designed in such a way that both
fixed and dynamic partnership can be facilitated.
Moreover, a scenario is developed to illustrate the
framework. We believe that this framework can
contribute to the development of solutions that can
connect disjoined platforms for supply chain
integration with proper protection for business
confidentiality.
This study is an initial step that allows us to
anticipate how cross platform privacy and security
can be implemented and what issues it brings.
Although CPPF has been demonstrated by the
aforementioned scenario, it still lacks an actual
implementation. Moreover, CPPF is based on a
supply chain configuration and it therefore might
not be applicable to all supply chains. However,
CPPF is designed to handle both fixed and dynamic
partnership and can therefore support many
different supply chain partnerships. Moreover,
there are still areas in the study that require further
investigation to establish a holistic foundation for
the privacy and security issues and concerns in
CPPF. The following potential further investigation
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can be the suggested: Relation based access control
method, the data characteristic models, and the
privacy preference scheme.
CPPF is actually a part of our study to
develop web services methodologies that allow
information sharing across platforms. The study
will continue to advance and in continuation a
prototype will be developed. Technologies such as
P3P (Platform for Enterprise Privacy Practices),
EPAL
(Enterprise
Privacy
Authorization
Language), ISTPA (Internet Security & Trust
Privacy Alliance), SAML (Security Assertion
Markup Language), and XACML (eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language) are currently
being evaluated for implementation of the
prototype in our study.
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